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Abstract 
This paper assesses a wide range of alternative proposals for post-2012 international 
climate policy regimes. We believe that these proposals will serve as a basis for de-
bates about how to configure post-2012 climate policy. The paper characterises and 
assesses the policy proposals along the lines of five key policy dilemmas. We argue 
that 1) many proposals have ideas on how to reduce emissions, but fewer have a solu-
tion on how to stimulate technical innovation; 2) many proposals formulate climate 
policy in isolation, while there are fewer proposals that try to mainstream climate 
policies in other policy areas; 3) many proposals advocate market-based solutions, 
while fewer realise that there are certain drawbacks to this solution especially at the 
international level; 4) most proposals have a preference for a UN-based regime, while 
a more fragmented regime, based on regional and sectoral arrangements may be 
emerging; and 5) most proposals have ideas about mitigation, but not many have 
creative ideas on how to integrate mitigation with adaptation.              
Keywords: climate change policy, post-2012 negotiations, energy policies.  
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1. Introduction 
At the Climate Change Conference in Montréal in 2005, the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change decided to start a dialogue to exchange experiences 
and analyse strategic approaches for long-term cooperative action to address climate 
change.1) The Parties did not have to start their dialogue from scratch. In the last few 
years, policy analysts have tabled a large and diverse number of proposals for a post-
2012 climate change regime. A few years ago, (Bodansky, Chou et al. 2004) pub-
lished a selection of 44 proposals. A number of additional proposals have been pub-
lished since then. We included eight additional proposals that have been published in 
the academic literature.2) All proposals are listed in Table 1 at the end of this paper. 
The proposals differ in many ways as they reflect the different preferences and 
worldviews of their authors. In this paper, we have classified the proposals along five 
policy choices that are, in our opinion, key to future negotiations on the global cli-
mate change regime. These five policy choices refer to questions of incentive struc-
tures (“carrots or sticks”), the relationships of climate change policies with other pol-
icy areas (“front door or back door”), the relative weight of market-based instruments 
(“markets or regulations”), multilateralism (“team player or John Wayne”), and fi-
nally of the relative weights of mitigation and adaptation (“adapt or mitigate”). These 
are difficult choices and we will henceforth label them “dilemmas”, although re-
sponses to any one dilemma may not be mutually exclusive. It is for example possible 
to use a mix of carrots and sticks as incentive mechanisms. We classified, for each 
proposal, the responses to the dilemmas on a 5-point scale that includes both extreme 
responses (e.g., the incentive structure should be “sticks”) to in-between responses 
(e.g., “a mix of carrots and sticks”). The classification was made by one of the au-
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thors and is obviously somewhat subjective. But by and large we believe that distri-
butions of the responses to the dilemmas that we show in simple diagrams give a fla-
vour of the direction of thinking in this field.  This paper differs from other papers 
that discuss post-2012 policy options in two respects. Firstly, our approach that fo-
cuses on policy dilemmas can be viewed as complementary to, for example, (Philibert 
and Pershing 2001)  (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003) and (Wittneben, Haxeltine et al. 2005) 
who assess options against classical assessment criteria such as effectiveness, effi-
ciency, and equity. Secondly, in comparison to the above-mentioned papers we dis-
cuss a much wider set of proposals.           
Sections 2 to 6 of this paper discuss the five policy dilemmas in greater detail and 
present the frequency distributions. Section 7 draws conclusions.            
 
2. Carrots or sticks 
The first dilemma is about incentive structure: is it better to punish bad behaviour (the 
stick) or to reward good behaviour (the carrot)? In dealing with an environmental 
problem such as climate change, economic theory suggests that the emissions that 
cause the problem be taxed – or that a system of tradable rights or permits to these 
emissions is established, to bring into the economic system the constraints set by the 
environmental system. The theory for such an environmental policy is classic and 
most climate change proposals follow it – emissions taxes and permit systems play a 
central role. Also, the European Commission, at the forefront of international climate 
policy, developed its strategy based on energy taxation and an emissions-trading 
scheme as part of its European Climate Change Programme (ECCP 2000). Direct 
regulation is another key component of European climate policy, including fuel effi-
ciency standards and a possible ban of candescent lighting. 
  5
By contrast, the United States has developed an alternative strategy, the Climate 
Change Technology Program (CCTP 2002) that emphasises the encouragement of in-
novation and technological solutions, and promotes international collaboration on 
their development (Abraham 2004). The focus on technology is founded on the belief 
that a combination of deep cuts in emissions and sustained economic growth can only 
be accomplished by a major technological transition in the economy’s production 
processes. At the core of the transition is a shift in the energy supply and demand sys-
tem. Increasing energy efficiency may be a cost-effective near-term mechanism to re-
duce emissions, but only to a limited extent. Ultimately, production is impossible 
without energy, and the United States consider it therefore more productive to search 
for a transformation of primary energy sources from fossil fuels to CO2-free energy 
technologies (Hoffert, Caldeira et al. 2002). Such a transformation requires incen-
tives, which include current subsidies and the promise of future profits, be it through 
the market, the patent system, or direct regulation. For instance, DuPont’s reward for 
innovation in HFC production was the ban on CFCs.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 shows that most proposals in our survey promote incentives to reduce emis-
sions, i.e., the  “stick”. Proposals that promote incentives to reward energy innova-
tion, i.e., the “carrot”, typically are from American origins (Schelling 1997; Barrett 
2003).  
The choice for the carrot (rewarding energy innovation) or the stick (carbon taxes, 
permits, standards) may represent a difference between an optimist’s and a pessi-
mist’s view on the economy’s capacity to develop and disentangle itself from its de-
pendence on fossil fuels. In the optimist’s view the economy only needs a gentle 
guide to change the direction of technological development – the carrot – while in the 
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pessimist’s view the economy needs a strong economic signal – the stick. Yet the 
division has more dimensions. The two options also differ in terms of static and dy-
namic efficiency, in stimulating or hampering economic growth, in distributional ef-
fects, in their financial and managerial demands on government, and in negotiation 
strategy. 
From a static perspective, that is, given existing technologies and past investments, 
greenhouse gas taxes and permits are the most efficient instruments to reach a climate 
target at the lowest cost. But technologies and investments develop over time, and it 
is now widely recognised that the dynamic properties of policy instruments are essen-
tial for mitigation costs in the longer term. Investments in knowledge and ‘green’ 
capital have social pay-offs that may exceed their private pay-offs substantially. Since 
private investors compare private costs to private benefits, private investments in 
knowledge and ‘green’ capital tend to fall short of socially optimal levels. Although a 
carbon tax, say, would create an incentive to innovate, technology spillovers imply 
that the private incentives are substantially less than the desired incentives. Further-
more, in a dynamic setting, the costs of climate policies, therefore, depend on whether 
they discourage or encourage investments (Kverndokk, Rosendahl et al. 2004). 
The assessment of climate policy’s effect on investments needs careful examination. 
A carbon or energy tax may hamper investments, but it also generates revenues that 
can be used to lower other (e.g., corporate profit) taxes with the effect of stimulating 
investments. Also, a carbon tax may lead to a decrease in investments specifically in 
the fossil fuel industry, but it may help to shape opportunities and investments for 
non-CO2 energy technologies. The total effect on investments is ambiguous. A tech-
nology subsidy may stimulate investments in knowledge, but the public expenses 
need to be paid for by increasing taxes, which may negatively affect overall invest-
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ments. Moreover, not all investments may yield equal social benefits. When a gov-
ernment authority subsidises a specific non-CO2 energy technology, it may err and it 
may find itself supporting a dead-end technology. Some technologies that now seem 
promising, may not deliver. Subsidies also have a notoriously bad record concerning 
their long-term availability, while technology development needs a stable long-term 
investment climate.  
The above arguments represent the neo-classical economic inclination to efficiency, 
but distributional effects are also important. A carbon or energy tax, or permit system, 
will lay the initial burden of emissions reductions on the oil producing, processing, 
and the energy-intensive sectors.3) The same is true for direct regulation of these ac-
tivities. These sectors are influential in the political arena, and when they complain 
that they loose competitiveness on the world market, this receives attention. Stimulat-
ing innovations in energy technologies, by contrast, favours the same industries, as 
they will be paid to develop new activities. Under such a policy regime, there is no 
need to compensate the energy and energy-intensive sectors. It should be recognised, 
however, that such a stimulating innovation policy is only feasible for rich countries: 
it is beyond the scope of many cash-strapped developing country’s governments.  
A focus on energy innovation will, if successful, deliver emissions reductions decades 
from now. It is therefore inherently incompatible with the Kyoto targets that demand 
immediate action from the developed (Annex B) countries (Claussen 2004). Direct 
regulation, a carbon tax or permit system are more certain instruments to deliver 
emission reductions in the short-term. But reducing uncertainty in the achievement of 
reduction targets comes at a price. When the emissions reduction target is less flexi-
ble, uncertainty in the mitigation costs increases. The choice between the carrot and 
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the stick partly is a choice between accepting uncertainty in environmental effec-
tiveness, versus accepting uncertainty in costs– in both the short term and the long 
term.4) 
Finally, a focus on innovation would lend itself to a series of sectoral policies, 
whereas taxes or permit trade would, in a first-best fashion, be applied economy-
wide. A series of sectoral policies may be less efficient, but the cost increase may be 
limited if competition is stronger within, than between, sectors. When economic ac-
tivities are concentrated in a few countries only (e.g., car building), effective interna-
tional cooperation on innovation requires fewer countries than does cooperation on 
taxes or permits. 
3. Front door or back door 
Greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced through climate policy (the front door), or 
as a side benefit of other policies (the back door). These “other policies” can be inter-
national, but they are more likely to be domestic – after all, most policies are domes-
tic. The overwhelming majority of the options chooses the front door, with a few ad-
ditionally calling for technological change and sustainable development (Figure 2). 
This is no surprise, as we studied only climate policy proposals. It is an open ques-
tion, however, whether greenhouse gas emission reduction is best achieved by an ex-
plicit climate policy or by other means. One area of policy making that stands out 
with regard to its linkages with the climate change issue concerns development and 
trade policies. Flexible instruments such as the CDM are actually devised to link cli-
mate change and development policies explicitly. On the other hand, development 
and trade policies may also hamper the feasibility of international climate change 
policies. Unilateral climate change policies in industrial countries will eventually lead 
to carbon leakages when investment decisions of energy-intensive companies are af-
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fected. Reversely, preventing such leakages by CO2-related border taxes may ad-
versely affect development goals in emerging economies.    
[Figure 2 around here] 
Purists argue that a policy that aims directly at the problem is always superior to indi-
rect policies. Unfortunately, not many countries have effective greenhouse gas reduc-
tion policies. Many countries do, however, have mature and effective policies on en-
ergy, air quality, technology, transport, and security – each of which could be instru-
mental in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, many adaptation measures 
could also be implemented in the context of other policies (e.g., spatial planning, wa-
ter management), serving multiple objectives.    
Policies to improve energy efficiency have been successful in many countries. Al-
though such policies are domestic, their impacts may be wider, through diffusion of 
technology, through the second-hand market in machinery, or because manufacturers 
choose to work to the strictest standard (e.g., the USEPA Energy Star programme). 
Many governments – in industrialised as well as (some) developing countries – sup-
port technological progress on the energy supply side, improving existing sources and 
developing new ones. This is crucially important for climate policy. At some point in 
this century, the world will run out of conventional oil and gas. This will imply a 
drastic overhaul of the energy sector. If the preferred successor to conventional oil 
and gas would be CO2-free (solar, nuclear, biomass, clean coal), this would alleviate 
further pressure on the climate system.  
Recent geopolitical developments and continuing tensions on world oil markets have 
pushed the energy security issue higher on the political agenda. Moreover, while in 
the past energy security used to be primarily an OECD issue (witness the rise of the 
International Energy Agency), it is now a truly global concern– although, by its very 
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nature, energy security is still primarily seen as a national issue, even in the EU. 
Fast growing Asian nations tend to be even more vulnerable than OECD nations to 
oil supply disruptions. The present dichotomy between nations preferring emission 
market agreements (EU, Russia) and those preferring technology development 
agreements (United States, China) can, according to some authors, at least partially be 
explained by their long-term energy security objectives and related domestic resource 
positions (Huntington and Brown 2004; Kemfert 2004). 
The perception of energy security risks has changed considerably since the issue be-
came a prominent energy policy objective in the wake of the oil crises of the 1970’s. 
At that time, the focus was primarily on the short-term consequences of high prices 
and the macroeconomic impacts with a corresponding emphasis on measures related 
to strategic stockpiling and macroeconomic policy (Bohi and Toman 1996). The em-
phasis has now shifted to long-term implications and broader areas of concern includ-
ing supply disruptions unrelated to oil markets, in particular in response to power sys-
tem reliability problems caused by liberalisation policies (Blyth and Lefevre 2004). In 
addition, the threat of terrorism has increased worries about physical disruptions 
caused by infrastructural vulnerabilities related to shipping routes, refineries, pipe-
lines and power networks (Farrell, Zerriffi et al. 2004). There is also concern about 
political instability in key supplier countries. When evaluating the potential of ad-
dressing climate change and energy security challenges simultaneously, it is impor-
tant to be aware of this widening perception. Energy security in a narrow sense has 
traditionally been viewed purely as a problem of energy resource diversification. En-
ergy security in a broader sense however includes other aspects of energy system de-
sign related to choices between distributed and centralised systems in general (Lovins 
and Lovins 1982). Properties of system resilience in addition to properties of fuel and 
technology diversity are important in this respect. 
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Few studies on the future architecture of post-Kyoto policy regimes explicitly ad-
dress climate change and energy security. Yet, synergy with domestic energy security 
agendas could improve the political feasibility of international climate change meas-
ures substantially. (Blyth and Lefevre 2004) develop a framework for measuring pos-
sible synergies quantitatively by comparing measures of climate change performance 
(level of CO2 emissions) and measures of energy security performance  (fuel supply 
diversity and back-up power requirements) for various energy scenarios. (Kessels and 
Bakker 2005) evaluate how energy security concerns could possibly be integrated in 
existing proposals for post-Kyoto policy regimes. They conclude that existing pro-
posals based on top-down target setting and market instruments offer limited oppor-
tunities. In target setting one could leave more room for national security related con-
straints. In emission markets one could privilege those who implement domestic 
mitigation measures in one way or another above those who settle their CO2 budget 
on the international market. The main conclusion of (Kessels and Bakker 2005) is 
that bottom-up, technology-oriented types of agreement offer more scope for energy 
security concerns than top-down, market-oriented approaches.  
Development policy is another option to do climate policy through the back door. 
Again, this is not clear-cut. While energy efficiency clearly improves with economic 
growth, it may be overwhelmed by additional demand for energy. A Kuznets curve 
for carbon dioxide emissions has not been established (Lindmark 2004; Galeotti, 
Lanza et al. 2006). In fact, the relationship between economic activity and energy use 
is complex and mixed (Lee and Chang 2007). One can therefore not a priori say that 
development policy would help reduce emissions. The verdict on reallocation of de-
velopment aid to emission abatement (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007) is incon-
clusive too. The same is true for liberalisation of international markets for goods, ser-
vices and capital. This would stimulate economic growth, which may be good or bad. 
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It would accelerate the diffusion of energy-efficient technology, which is good for 
climate change, but it would also increase the demand for travel and transport, which 
is bad for climate change. The relationship between development and adaptation is 
clearer. In general, richer economies are less vulnerable to climate change (Tol 2002). 
This aggregate relationship does not hold, however, for every aspect. Some climate 
change impacts would fall rapidly with economic growth – infectious diseases are a 
good example (Tol, Ebi et al. 2007) – while other impacts would increase – for in-
stance, the value of ecosystem impacts (Tol 2002). So, while development policy may 
help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as well as vulnerability to climate change, it 
is clear that this is true only for a judicious choice of possible development policies. 
Solving the climate problem on the back of other policies would theoretically not be 
the first-best approach, but it might well be effective enough if robust policies are in 
place. Adjusting a policy to serve multiple goals may, on the one hand, increase its 
costs – and sometimes excessively so5) – but, on the other hand, may also benefit 
from synergies (and avoid the shifting of externalities) between different policy areas. 
In a number of the policy areas mentioned above, the climate-friendly alternative 
might be the preferred one anyway, both with respect to mitigation and adaptation. 
A precondition for a successful ‘backdoor’ policy is the existence of robust policies in 
relevant, adjacent policy areas. If such robust policies are not in place, as in some de-
veloping countries, obviously not much can be expected from such a policy. Whether 
or not backdoor policies may be an effective option would therefore need careful con-
sideration on a case-by-case basis.   Examples of post-2012 proposals that emphasize 
“backdoor” approaches are, for example, (Athanasiou and Baer 2006; Winkler, 
Brouns et al. 2006).         
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4. Markets or regulation 
Another division in climate change policies is between market solutions and direct 
regulations. At one end of the spectrum, many economists have repeatedly empha-
sised that we only need to get the prices right: give greenhouse gas emissions their 
price and leave it to the market to find solutions. In this view, the climate change 
problem is considered as a missing market; and the problem is solved once we create 
this market by allocating property rights. The invisible hand of the market will do the 
rest. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the view – often expressed by engi-
neers and governance specialists – that price signals are insufficient to change the en-
vironmental performance of firms and households. In this view, there are many tech-
nical possibilities to lower energy use and the carbon intensity of energy supply at 
zero or even negative costs, but the market – in search for short-run profits – system-
atically fails to implement these ‘win-win’ solutions. Hence, advocates of the regula-
tory view argue that governments should enforce standards for housing, transport, and 
industries’ energy efficiency, and for the carbon intensity of energy supply. 
Economists used to fiercely oppose the direct regulation view as an inefficient in-
strument, but many have come to recognise that direct regulation often may not work 
that badly after all. The opposition comes from the economic assertion that there can 
be no negative-cost fixes to climate change, as competition drives all economic actors 
to search actively for any profit-enhancing opportunities. In this view, engineering 
fixes are considered typical results of know-it-alls who overlook many real but hard-
to-measure costs such as for extra management. Yet, economists have also started to 
realise that there may be inefficiencies in the economy as a whole, not just at the mi-
cro level, that might be overcome through direct regulation. As innovators typically 
do not succeed to appropriate the full social value of their innovations, they spend 
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less on research than desirable. Using market instruments, the public authority may 
provide subsidies for research, but this may create its own diversion, as ‘research’ is 
an accounting construct that enterprises can exaggerate to reduce taxes. Alternatively, 
the government may announce that it will demand an entire sector to comply with the 
most energy efficient technology available. The patent value for any new technology 
improving on energy efficiency will increase substantially if all firms will have to ap-
ply the technology. In the end, the direct regulation may boost innovation better than 
the research subsidy does. 
A second benefit of direct regulation can lie in its trickle-down effect on other sectors 
and countries. When manufacturers are forced to comply with an emissions directive 
on a sufficiently large market, e.g., Germany or California, it may be more profitable 
for them to apply the same technology to produce for all markets, instead of applying 
different technologies to produce for different markets. In economic terms, an agent 
controlling specific features of a large market can exert substantial market power that 
affects other markets as well. This could also be very significant for that group of de-
veloping countries whose markets function so poorly that it would hamper the suc-
cessful implementation of market-based instruments anyway.    
Within the domain of market versus regulation, the climate proposals are distributed 
pretty evenly (Figure 3). Most remarkably, there is a substantial group of climate pol-
icy proposals that use a hybrid approach with elements of both regulation and mar-
kets. Many proposals specify regulation on a broader level, not per product but per 
sector or country.  
[Figure 3 around here] 
A typical example is the system of portfolio standard rating, where industries are 
bound to limit their emissions per output or per value added, but are also allowed to 
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buy extra emission permits or sell a surplus of emission permits in an emissions 
trading scheme (Benedick 2001). Hybrid schemes provide firms the flexibility to re-
duce less when necessary or more when possible. Inclusion of Joint Implementation 
and Clean Development Mechanism projects in an emission-trading scheme would 
further integrate market instruments and regulation. 
Development of hybrid mechanisms needs careful design. They may combine the 
advantages of market and regulation, but they may also multiply the disadvan-
tages. The flexibility of a market may avoid individual firms facing unnecessarily 
high costs, while the overall regulation on a sector or country level ensures effec-
tiveness. But it is also possible that market flexibility causes a sector not to de-
velop new low-CO2 technologies, while the trading scheme leads to high monitor-
ing and transaction costs shifted to the public sector. 
5. Team player or John Wayne 
The proposals for a post-2012 climate policy architecture can be distinguished ac-
cording to the degree to which they support multilateral solutions as opposed to 
small-party agreements, or pure unilateralism.  
On the one side of the spectrum are authors who continue to support the multilateral 
approach enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol and earlier in the UNFCCC, that is, the at-
tempt of reaching a compromise that mediates the interests of all nations. On the 
other side of the spectrum are those who seek to complement, or to replace, the Kyoto 
regime through small-party regimes, plurilateral and bilateral agreements or unilateral 
measures outside the Kyoto Regime (Biermann 2005; Asselt 2007). Most proposals 
from developing country authors support multilateralism, while most from the United 
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States lean towards unilaterally initiated agreements in line with trends in other is-
sue areas (Newman, Thakur et al. 2006). Europeans are divided on the issue. 
[ Figure 4 around here ] 
Unilateralists, mostly of United States’ origin, have suggested alternative, regional 
agreements with like-minded countries, for example of the United States with states 
in Latin America or with China and possibly other key developing countries (Stewart 
and Wiener 2003). (Bodansky 2002), for instance, argues for an ‘institutional hedging 
strategy’ with the United States becoming the creator of ‘a more diversified, robust 
portfolio of international climate change policies in the long term’.  For Bodansky, 
such an approach would allow negotiation with only the more ‘moderate’ developing 
countries, while disabling ‘the hard-line developing countries […] to prevent more 
moderate developing states from joining’ (Bodansky 2002). Secondly, unilateralists 
are often less than enthusiastic about the role of the United Nations in climate gov-
ernance, and see the United Nations’ system as part of the problem rather than part of 
the solution. Negotiations under the United Nations umbrella are seen as being too 
‘large, unwieldy, ideologically laden’ to oversee the ‘simple tasks of the kind re-
quired [under the climate convention]’ (Bodansky 2002). Thirdly, unilateralists have 
proposed joint action through issue-specific agreements (cf., the analysis in (Asselt, 
Biermann et al. 2004)). These could include targets for specific sectors, e.g., energy-
efficiency standards for the global automobile industry that would need to bring to-
gether only the most important car-producing countries (Barrett 2002); specific poli-
cies, such as energy taxes; agreements and targets for co-operation in scientific re-
search and technology development (Benedick 2001; Barrett 2002; Aldy, Barrett et 
al. 2003), including on carbon sequestration, renewables, geological storage and en-
ergy conservation; targets on technology transfer and capacity building; and specific 
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measures to increase co-operation regarding adaptation. Finally, unilateralists are 
often at the forefront of promoting public-private and private-private partnerships at 
the global level, notably in supporting the so-called ‘type-2 outcomes’ of the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (as opposed to type-1 traditional inter-
governmental agreements) (cf., for an overview (Hale and Mauzerall 2004)). 
Not all of these proposals and approaches deny a role for, or the continuing existence 
of, a multilateral framework. In theory, issue-specific or regional agreements could be 
reached outside the climate convention, but also within its framework or even as part 
of an amended Kyoto Protocol. Many proposals also suggest a role for the climate 
convention as facilitator of other approaches Sugiyama, 2005 #35} or envisage a re-
turn to this framework over time (e.g.,(Bodansky 2002; Bodansky 2002; Stewart and 
Wiener 2003)), especially since there are a number of recent indicators that signal 
such a return (Gupta 2007). Yet in sum, the thrust of most unilateralists is to find 
new, often also more flexible ways that include fewer nations for joint action than a 
fully multilateral approach requires. 
Multilateralists, on the other hand, continue to support the universal approach in cli-
mate policy as in other policy domains. Multilateralism allows for side-payments 
across negotiation clusters within a policy domain and across different policies; and it 
minimises the risk for smaller nations to be coerced into bilateral agreements with 
powerful nations that might offer them suboptimal negotiation outcomes. In particular 
for the many smaller and medium-sized developing countries, unity is strength, and 
multilateralism its guarantee (Gupta 2006).  
Unilateralism and multilateralism can coexist only to a limited extent. Decision-
makers need to make choices. On the one hand, sectoral, selective or non-legally 
binding agreements bear the promise of quicker solutions since negotiations are easier 
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given the smaller number of actors and interests at the table and the non-binding 
nature of the outcome. The advantage of fewer parties has been emphasised by some 
strands of negotiation theory, which posit stronger commitments and faster progress 
the fewer (like-minded) parties participate in a given negotiation.  
On the other hand, a selective agreement will produce a solution that applies only to 
the few participating countries and fits the interests only of those countries, and it is 
not guaranteed that other countries will later join. While the problem of free riders 
was effectively addressed in the Montreal Protocol by limiting the trade opportunities 
of those outside the system, this is not the case in the climate regime. Moreover, a 
quick success in negotiating sectoral agreements might run counter to long-term suc-
cess, when important structural regime elements have not sufficiently been resolved. 
And finally, smaller agreements only with few ‘like-minded countries’ will decrease 
the opportunity for creating package deals that will minimise the overall policy ac-
ceptance and effectiveness (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005; Tangen and Hasselknippe 
2005). At the same time, such agreements will tend to completely marginalise the 
smaller countries who are especially vulnerable to climate change (Gupta 2007). 
Regional agreements of a few like-minded players, in the hope that others will later 
follow, may not bring the long-term trust and regime stability that is needed in the 
climate domain. The post-2012 climate governance system requires institutional 
mechanisms that are trustworthy, stable, provide for cross-issue bargains, and include 
all nations. Some would argue that this can only be offered by a global framework 
agreement that sets out the constitutional rules of climate governance in the 21st cen-
tury, and detailed agreements on subquestions that are negotiated within the larger, 
stable, normative system that sustains the ‘grand bargain’ (Müller 2003; Biermann 
2005). Furthermore, some writers also argue that “Washington has yet to understand 
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that nothing is more dangerous for a ‘hyperpower’ than the temptation of unilater-
alism” (Hoffmann 2000) and or that globalisation itself might dilute the power of the 
unilateralists (Nye 2000). Ironically, it might be the multiplication of climate change 
litigation against U.S. companies and agencies, both within the United States and out-
side, that might convince the U.S. government of the need for multilateral solutions 
on the issue, or perhaps of unilateral emissions reduction. Current litigation efforts, if 
successful, could also put the large developing countries on notice that if they con-
tinue to emit without some abatement effort, they too could be held liable in interna-
tional and/or domestic courts (Gupta 2007), as past emissions can perhaps be excused 
because of ignorance about their consequences, but future emissions cannot (Tol and 
Verheyen 2004). The prospect of liability may, of course, also reduce the political in-
centives for large developing countries, such as India and China, to adopt a construc-
tive attitude in climate negotiations and climate research.  
6. Adapt or mitigate 
Most climate policies are traditionally targeted at mitigating greenhouse gases, with 
adaptation to climate variability and change playing only a minor role. Most policy 
options propose a continuation of this strategy as only 6 out of 44 policy proposals 
have identified adaptation as a serious policy issue (Figure 5). These proposals are 
usually the ones that pay most attention to North-South issues (Müller 2002; Ott, 
Winkler et al. 2004; BASIC 2006). 
[ Figure 5 around here ] 
Historically, the impacts and adaptation issues were disconnected from the emissions 
issue to reduce the likelihood of discussions on liability and compensation (Gupta 
1997). There are many reasons as to why adaptation is not high on the policy agenda, 
although it is increasingly recognised that immediate adaptation action is required in 
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several economic sectors (e.g., flood protection, drought management, heat waves 
and health) (EEA 2004). Apart from the need to avoid liability discussions, there are 
also substantive arguments such as that adaptation is best arranged at local to provin-
cial levels (Tol 2005), because of the uncertainty on the magnitude of future climate 
variability and its impact at smaller scales (regional and local) and the specific cul-
tural and institutional contexts within which such adaptation needs to take place. 
Hence, it is difficult to develop standard, across the board adaptation (on top of cur-
rent policies) to adapt to future climate variability and change (Burton, Huq et al. 
2002). This uncertainty leads to the inevitable question of how much extra adaptation 
investments are required? Which investments are robust to a variety of future climate 
scenarios? And finally, how much adaptation is needed given a certain greenhouse 
gas level achieved by mitigation policies? 
Other policy obstacles for developing adaptation policies are a lack of both policy and 
legislative frameworks, particularly at the local and regional levels, and insufficient 
coordination between policies targeted at individual economic sectors. It also appears 
that long-term developments such as climate change (>10 year) are seldom addressed 
in current national policies.  
Nonetheless, some adaptation policies are being developed and implemented. For ex-
ample, adaptation policies are mainstreamed in ongoing sectoral policies – most no-
tably in countries with a long tradition in developing water management adaptations 
to extreme weather events (Aerts and Droogers 2004). Furthermore, risk management 
and disaster preparedness policies are gradually adopting climate change as an addi-
tional risk that should be addressed in financial arrangements and (re-) insurance 
(Berz 1999). Some adaptation initiatives are being developed such as research pro-
grammes on climate change impacts. But with the exception of the Millennium De-
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velopment Goals that do explicitly address adaptation as an important process to 
prepare for and cope with a changing climate, integration of climate change consid-
erations in key policies, such as policies on biodiversity, agriculture, international 
trade, fresh water resources and coastal zone management, has not yet taken place to 
a large extent. 
Recent publications by insurance companies and other financial institutes support the 
argument of having a combined mitigation and adaptation policy. For example, (Mu-
nich_Re 2005) states that weather-related disasters cause two-thirds of direct eco-
nomic losses worldwide and cause three-quarters of life fatalities, with 80 percent of 
these fatalities occurring in the poorest countries. Global direct losses from so-called 
great floods have increased by a factor of 10 between the 1960s and the 1990s, but 
this increase is generally attributed to increasing habitation of vulnerable areas and 
wealth increases rather than to climate change (e.g.,(Changnon 2003)). Finally more 
controversial adaptation policies are related to geo engineering options that aim at di-
rectly influencing atmospheric processes (Weitzman 2007). 
The above facts reveal that, apart from climate change, extreme weather events al-
ready have a profound effect on natural and economic resources. It is therefore rec-
ommended that new adaptation policies should be part of an integrated mitigation-
adaptation policy, in particular those that relate to disaster risk reduction (e.g., (Hoff, 
Warner et al. 2005)). As adaptation measures have to be implemented at the regional 
and local scale, new policies should be specifically targeted at these scales. Both 
cross-scale communication and cross-sectoral participation is a prerequisite for a suc-
cessfully implementation of new adaptation policies. The financing of adaptation and 
disaster risk management, however, remains a critical issue in climate policy, as cur-
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rent funds for adaptation under the UNFCCC are limited (Bouwer and Vellinga 
2005). 
7. Conclusions 
A new period of intense debate about the future of international climate policy has 
begun. With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005, policy mak-
ers have started to look towards the end of the first commitment period in 2012 to as-
sess whether national emissions reductions targets will be met. They have also started 
to look at what will happen post-2012. One option would be to build on Kyoto, estab-
lish a second commitment period and employ the same approaches and measures es-
tablished since negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1992; and this option is presently be-
ing pursued with the UNFCCC, especially as all Parties to the Convention, including 
the United States, are bound by international law to not undertake policies that go 
against the spirit of this agreement. Although the United States has initiated a number 
of agreements with other countries on climate change related issues, the latest of 
which is one with Australia, South Korea, India and China, it continues to maintain in 
its policy documents that these are in line with the US commitments under the 
UNFCCC (Gupta 2007). However, the actual impact of these initiatives is difficult to 
predict and may challenge key notions of the Convention. In recognition of these 
questions, analysts in Europe, the United States, Japan and some developing countries 
have developed a series of alternative proposals over the past decade and more. Now 
is a good time to review these options: to assess whether they contain frameworks or 
ideas that could play a role in securing effective global climate management. 
This policy assessment characterised a wide range of options according to some fun-
damental dilemmas in climate policy. Our main conclusions in characterising policy 
options are: 
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• There are many ideas about how to tackle global climate problems by im-
proving cost-efficient emission reduction from a static perspective (sticks), 
but there are fewer ideas about how to tackle the problem of stimulating 
global technological innovation from a dynamic perspective (carrots). Creat-
ing an appropriate architecture for a balanced approach combining the aims of 
short-term static efficiency and long-term dynamic efficiency is a key post-
2012 requirement. 
• Many proposals for formulating climate policy in isolation from other policies 
(front door) exist, but there are fewer ideas about how to mainstream climate 
policy in other, less controversial policy arenas in a coherent and transparent 
way. Creating effective issue-linkages (back door) between the climate policy 
arena and other policy arenas has been and will continue to be a key post-
2012 requirement. Although making such issue-linkages may sound relatively 
simple, the history of the negotiations in other arenas, the different power 
politics, and possibly different parties engaged in these negotiations, imply 
that issue-linkage that may sound simple to start with may be very difficult to 
achieve.  
• It is difficult to develop new options that rely exclusively on either market 
forces or regulatory measures - markets and regulations must be viewed as 
mutually dependent and reinforcing, rather than alternative courses of action. 
While there is a great appetite among some governments for greater focus on 
incentivising through market-based instruments, the drawback is often that 
they do not provide the same assurance that environmental targets can veri-
fiably be met on time.  
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• Choosing between a multilateral UN-based order and a more fragmented 
set of arrangements depends on the worldviews that drive politics in different 
countries. Countries that have been involved in international wars on their 
own territories and are relatively weak in the international arena generally 
seek a rule-based multilateral order, whereas countries that see themselves as 
having growing international power may prefer to guide global politics rather 
than democratically participate in it. Although the existing multilateral system 
is under pressure, we expect that there will be stiff competition between the 
two approaches, and often collaboration. The key is to find ways to accom-
modate both approaches.  
• Many ideas exist for tackling greenhouse gas mitigation, but there are few 
ideas about tackling problems of adaptation, or for integrating mitigation and 
adaptation. It seems clear that at a broad strategic level there is a potential 
trade-off between mitigation and adaptation – more of one implies less of the 
other – but this is seldom taken up in climate policy proposals. This may be 
because national interests with respect to mitigation and adaptation differ – 
some countries being more sensitive to the need for adaptation than others – 
and because mitigation actions in one country cannot be easily traded for ad-
aptation actions in another. There are clear cases when mitigation and adapta-
tion should be integrated – as with rising demand for air conditioning in re-
sponse to higher summer temperatures. But this need not always be the case. 
In practice, there is little integration in the proposals. Perhaps this is also be-
cause mitigation policies are inherently more ‘front door’, while adaptation 
policies are more ‘back door’ (such as disaster relief and prevention). 
  25
The art of building an effective and inclusive post-2012 climate regime, which 
provides dynamic incentives for technological innovation and behaviour change and 
spreads burdens fairly, is an enormous challenge. We have classified the proposals 
according to five policy dilemmas which we believe are key to future negotiations. 
Clearly, these dilemmas will need to be dealt with by national and international nego-
tiators. Our review also points to the need to anchor climate policy more firmly 
within economic, social and environmental policies, and to avoid regarding it as a 
special and isolated case. 
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Notes 
1) Decision -/CP.11. Montreal, 2005.  
2) In our selection of proposals we did not include “official” documents, such as 
for example, the declaration of the G8 Summit of Gleaneagles (Grubb 2005). 
Although important as they may be in the political process, by their nature 
they are not very explicit about the choices and confine themselves to under-
lining some broad principles and calling for “dialogue”.  
3) In the short term, this burden is largely passed on to consumers. 
4) In the short term, the choice between taxes and tradable permits revolves 
around the trade-off between target and cost uncertainty. 
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5) Compare the famous proposition of Tinbergen that in economic policy the 
number of policy instruments should at least be as large as the number of pol-
icy objectives ((Tinbergen 1952)). 
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Table 1 Proposals for post-2012 climate change policy regimes 
Proposed regime Source Characteristics of the 
proposed regimea 
  I II III IV V 
1.2 Kyoto 
UN 5 5 3 5 5 
Ability to pay (Jacoby, Schmalensee et al. 1999) 5 5 5 5 5 
Agreed domestic carbon taxes (Cooper 1998) 5 5 5 5 5 
Bottom-Up (Reinstein 2004) 4 5 3 1 5 
Brazilian proposal (Brazil 1997) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Broad but shallow beginning (Schmalensee 1996) 5 5 n.a 1 5 
Climate Marshall plan (Schelling 1997; Schelling 2002) 1 5 n.a 1 5 
Contraction and convergence (Meyer 1998) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Converging markets (Tangen and Hasselknippe 2005) 5 5 5 1 5 
Domestic hybrid trading schemes (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002) 5 5 5 5 5 
Dual intensity targets (Kim and Baumert 2002) 5 5 5 3 5 
Dual track (Kameyama 2003) 5 5 3 3 5 
Equal mitigation costs (Babiker and Eckaus 2000) 5 5 3 n.a 5 
Expanded common but differentiated (Gupta and Bhandari 1999) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Further differentiation (SEPA 2002) 5 5 3 5 5 
Global framework (CAN 2003) 5 5 n.a 5 4 
Global preference score (Müller 2001) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Global Triptych (Groenenberg, Blok et al. 2004) 5 5 2 5 5 
Graduation and deepening (Michaelowa, Butzengeiger et al. 2005) 5 5 5 5 4 
Growth baseline (Hargrave, Helme et al. 1998) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Harmonized carbon taxes (Nordhaus 2005) 5 5 5 5 5 
Human development goals (Pan 2005) 5 5 n.a 1 5 
Hybrid emissions trading (Aldy, Orszag et al. 2001) 4 5 5 3 5 
Insurance for adaptation (Jaeger 2003) 5 5 4 1 3 
International agreements on energy efficiency (Ninomiya 2003) 4 5 1 5 5 
Keep it simple, stupid (Gupta 2003) 5 5 3 5 5 
Long-term permit programme (Peck and Teisberg 2003) 5 5 5 5 5 
Multi-dimensional structure (METI 2003) 3 5 2 2 5 
Multi-sector convergence (Sijm, Jansen et al. 2001) 5 5 2 5 5 
Multistage (Höhne, Phylipsen et al. 2005) 5 5 n.a 4 5 
Orchestra of treaties (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005) 3 5 3 2 5 
Parallel climate policy (Stewart and Wiener 2003) 5 5 5 1 5 
Per capita allocation (Agarwal 2001) 5 5 2 5 5 
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Portfolio approach (Benedick 2001) 2 4 3 2 5 
Purchase of a global public good (Bradford 2004) 5 5 5 1 5 
Safety valve (Pizer 2005) 5 5 5 2 5 
Safety value with buyer liability (Victor 2003) 3 5 5 2 5 
Safe landing in emissions growth (Blanchard 2002) 5 5 5 5 5 
South-North dialogue (Ott, Winkler et al. 2004) 5 5 n.a 5 4 
Sustainable development PAM (Winkler, Brouns et al. 2006) 3 3 3 3 5 
Technology backstop protocol (Edmonds and Wise 1998) 5 5 4 5 5 
Technology-centred approach (Barrett 2003) 2 4 5 1 4 
Three-part policy architecture (Stavins 2004) 5 5 5 5 5 
Two-part commitments for ind. countries (Bodansky, Chou et al. 2004) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
UNFCCC Impact response instrument (Müller 2002) 5 5 n.a 5 1 
Broadening the climate regime (Torvanger, Bang et al. 2005) 5 5 n.a 5 3 
Common but differentiated convergence (Höhne, Elzen et al. 2006) 5 5 n.a 5 5 
Sao Paulo proposal (BASIC 2006) 4 5 n.a 5 4 
Global climate certificate system (Wicke 2005) 5 4 n.a 5 5 
Vattenfall proposal (Vattenfall 2006) 5 5 5 3 5 
Greenhouse development rights (Athanasiou and Baer 2006) 5 3 1 5 5 
Sector-based approach (Schmidt, Helme et al. 2006) 3 4 1 1 5 
Action targets (Baumert and Goldberg 2006) 5 3 n.a 5 5 
a)
 explanation of Roman and Arabic numerals:  
I : carrot (1), more carrot than stick (2), a bit of both (3), more stick than carrot (4), stick (5) 
II : back door (1), more back than front (2), a bit of both (3), more front than back (4), front door (5) 
III : regulation (1), more regulation than market (2), a bit of both (3), more market than regulation (4), market 
(5) 
IV : John Wayne (1), more John than team (2), a bit of both (3), more team than John (4), team player (5) 
V : adaptation (1), more adaptation than mitigation (2), a bit of both (3), more mitigation than adaptation (4), 
mitigation (5). 
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Figure 1. The bulk 
of the current pro-
posals for a cli-
mate regime em-
phasise emission 
reduction (sticks) 
over innovation 
(carrots), including 
the Kyoto Proto-
col. 
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Figure 2. The bulk 
of the current pro-
posals emphasise 
front door over 
back door, as does 
the Kyoto Proto-
col. 
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Figure 3. Most of the cur-
rent proposals for a cli-
mate regime emphasise 
the market mechanism 
(markets), although mixed 
regimes (mixed), as in the 
Kyoto Protocol, are also 
popular. 
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Figure 4. The current pro-
posals are polarised be-
tween a regime of strong 
international law (team 
player) – including the 
Kyoto Protocol – and a re-
gime of unilateral measures 
and small-party approaches 
(John Wayne). 
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Figure 5. Most 
current proposals 
emphasise mitiga-
tion over adapta-
tion, including the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
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